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Too often, studies on il Risorgimento, and on modern Italian history in general,
tend to undermine or fail to acknowledge the efforts and agency of the peasantry in the
critical moments of Italy’s history, and the extent to which these contributions (however
unwittingly) paved the way for various political ends. This thesis thus seeks to give credit
to and shed light upon the unsung heroes of il Risorgimento and Italian history, the
masses of hard-working, faithful individuals that have always striven tirelessly against
the historical injustices that have plagued that ill-fated peninsula.
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ABSTRACT
ROBERT CORBAN: Liberal Policy and the Peasant Condition in Garibaldi’s Sicily,
1860
(Under the direction of Chiarella Esposito)
This study seeks to document and detail the historical narrative and experience of
the Sicilian peasantry at the time of Italian unification or, as the entire movement is
commonly called, il Risorgimento. Focusing principally on the period between Italian
revolutionary Giuseppe Garibaldi’s successful expedition in the first few days of April
1860, throughout the next six months during his brief prodictatorship and on into the
months and years immediately following Sicily’s annexation to Piedmont-Sardinia, this
thesis represents a much-needed contribution to the new school of revisionist scholarship
on il Risorgimento. It does not refute the findings of previous revisionist interpretations
of this movement, and indeed reiterates the conclusions of a number of scholars and
historians’ works before it in that it finds that the actions and liberal policy decisions of
Garibaldi’s prodictatorial regime resulted in the further perpetuation of the alreadyimpoverished status of the peasantry in Sicilian society. However, it does draw upon new
sources to assert that the peasantry’s choice to revolt in April 1860 as well as in the six
years following the annexation to Piedmont-Sardinia in October was indeed a rational
decision, and one that signals the achievement of some level of political and social
consciousness that was not present or realized before this time. These sources include the
correspondence of the British consuls stationed in Sicily at this time, a series of
agricultural reports commissioned by the Italian parliament and a diary from one of
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Garibaldi’s troops, as well as a range of secondary literatures. This thesis also offers a
critique of the essentialist practices and scholarship of proponents of meridionalismo, or
the rough equivalent of Edward Said’s ‘orientalism’ as manifested in the southern half of
the Italian peninsula. It also presents the theoretical concept of a ‘collective social
defense mechanism’ embedded in Sicilian society, which has been brought to life and
cemented at the center of Sicilian culture by a number of actors and occupying powers
throughout history. This mechanism accounts for the state of poverty endured by the
Sicilian peasantry throughout much of the nineteenth century as well as the gross levels
of crime, corruption and injustice that are still apparent on the island to this day.
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INTRODUCTION

This project was born out of the naïve intention of discovering the fundamental,
root causes of il Problema del Mezzogiorno and of answering the perennial Questione
Meridionale, both of which refer to Southern Italy’s apparent inability to ‘modernize’
along the same lines as its northern counterpart. Understanding the reasons and meaning
of the general lack of economic development in Southern Italy has confounded scholars,
politicians and citizens of Italy for centuries though, and the solution to this problem and
the answer to this question do not emerge in a form that any remotely concise work could
hope to encompass. In examining this problem, one is faced with an intricate, nuanced
dynamic of historical forces and actors that have manifested themselves in the very
localized manner that historical themes and continuities so often do in Italy. In this
regard, a drastic narrowing of scope and limitation in temporal and spatial context is a
critical prerequisite in conducting scholarship on the Mezzogiorno.
One exemplary avenue for exploring these issues is Sicily, the sublime, sun-baked
isle whose inhabitants have for centuries suffered the most from the socioeconomic and
political deficiencies that have long characterized the southern half of the Italian
peninsula. In many respects, this island also constitutes and exemplifies some of the gross
impediments to success in the modern global economy that greater Italy suffers from.
Indeed, the famed Italian sociologist Luigi Barzini framed it as such, stating that
1

“Sicily is the schoolroom model of Italy for beginners, with every Italian quality and
defect magnified, exasperated and brightly coloured.”1
Similarly, while both Italy and Sicily’s problems prove recurrent throughout their
respective histories, certain moments exist wherein opportunities for sociopolitical
development seemed to have been most egregiously missed. Foremost among these is il
Risorgimento, the nineteenth-century movement for unification that resulted in the
creation of the nation-state now bearing the name Italy. However, until the last half
century or so, a great historiographical divide has hindered the interpretation of this
event. Driven forward by the teleological interpretations of liberal and Marxist historians
alike, a great, mythic narrative of the Italian Risorgimento has developed to prevent its
accurate representation. The liberal camp espouses a story of an unbridled and
revolutionary nationalist vigor, driven forward by a united body of skillful diplomats,
politicians and revolutionaries: the legendary Garibaldi, the skillful and cunning Cavour,
and the proud and elegant King of Savoy. Its Marxist opposition frames this movement as
something quite different: a story of factionalism, regionalism and political
trasformismo,2 a story of clandestine diplomacy and political subversion, veiled by the
birth of nation and nationalism. For Marxist historians, the Risorgimento marked the
construction of a mere façade of political unity, an egregious practice in ‘unconditional

1

Luigi Barzini, The Italians: A Full-Length Portrait Featuring Their Manners and Morals (New York:
Touchstone 1996) 252.
2
Marxist scholar and founder of the Italian Communist Party Antonio Gramsci discusses this term in his
most renowned work, breaking it down into two types of “trasformismo,” the relevant case in this instance
being that of “molecular” tranformism, or the manner in which “individual political figures formed by the
democratic opposition parties are incorporated individually into the conservative-moderate ‘political class’
(characterized by its aversion to any intervention of the popular masses in state life, to any organic reform
which would substitute a ‘hegemony’ for the crude, dictatorial ‘dominance’)” Antonio Gramsci, Ed.
Quintin Hoare. Trans. Geoffrey Nowell Smith. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci
(New York: International Publishers, 1971) 58.

2

unitarianism,’3 and the ultimate perpetuation of the social and political divisions that have
plagued peninsular Italy since the fall of the Roman Empire. For the Marxists, il
Risorgimento represented a flawed attempt at a true revolution, a “passive revolution,” as
the school’s founder Antonio Gramsci declared it. Indeed, national unity stood as a noble
gain and accomplishment, and one that would prove to alter the course of European and
world politics for years to come, but what were the social consequences for the masses of
this Italian brand of Realpolitik? What could have happened differently? Could Cavour or
his opposition in Giueseppe Garibaldi or Giuseppe Mazzini have acted in such a manner
as to prevent the calamitous social consequences that resulted from this process? Indeed,
if they could have, why did they choose not to?
The Marxists have been unable to depart from these sorts of counterfactual
endeavors. Both of these approaches have also been influenced and their findings
obscured by the presence of a certain meridionalismo, or the rough Italian equivalent of
Edward Said’s ‘orientalism’ as manifested and bestowed upon the inhabitants of the
southern half of the Italian peninsula.4 Meridionalismo and its prophets (‘meridionalisti’)
have served to perpetuate images of southern difference and ‘backwardness,’ as well as
southerners’ supposedly inherent ‘vulgarity’ and ‘criminality.’5 It was not until the latter
half of the twentieth century that a group of revisionist historians were able to transcend
meridionalismo and build upon and learn from these earlier counterproductive

3

This term was first applied by the Italian revolutionary and later member of Parliament Agostino Bertani
located in Della opposizione parlamentare [Milan, 1865]. 15. as cited in Raymond Grew, “How Success
Spoiled the Risorgimento.” Journal of Modern History 34.4 (1962): 239-253. 251.
4
Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Random House 1978)
5
See John Dickie’s Darkest Italy: The Nation and Stereotypes of the Mezzogiorno, 1860-1900 (New York:
St. Martin’s Palgrave Macmillian 2009) and Jane Schneider’s edited volume Italy's 'Southern Question':
Orientalism in One Country (London: Berg Publishers 1998) for two recent attempts to problematize and
debunk this logic and approach.
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historiographical debates to unravel some of the mythologized and politicized dimensions
of the Risorgimento. Utilizing a methodological framework that seeks to account for
localized reactions and causalities within the old meta-historical interpretations,6 this new
generation of scholars and historians has paved the way for a refreshing approach to the
study of the Risorgimento. British scholars John Davis and Lucy Riall, both of whose
works will be consulted throughout this essay, represent the foremost of the AngloAmerican revisionists. With each of these new studies comes a new understanding of the
many social consequences of the study in pragmatic politics that is Italian unification.
Standing out amongst these consequences is the fate of the Italian peasantry, the majority
of the Sicilian population, a segment which one early Italian sociologist characterized as
“the backbone of the country, and . . . perhaps, the best element of the population.”7
A focused study of the Sicilian peasantry helps to magnify some of the historical
sentiments and experiences of the Risorgimento, and in doing so provides a much needed
contribution to this innovative new historiographical approach. In order to conduct such a
study, one must narrow the temporal scope to the months just after the landing of
Garibaldi and his Mille (‘Thousand’) on May 11, 1860, the brief period during which
Garibaldi was hailed as prodictator of all Sicily. Although, as the reader will see,
Garibaldi was not present as an active administrative agent for much of this time, the
various actors and figures that came to assume many of the administrative posts in Sicily
6

See Lucy Riall The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society and National Unification (New York: Routledge
Publishing 1994), for a comprehensive examination of this new school of interpretation and Robert Lumley
and Jonathan Morris’s edited work The New History of the Italian South: The Mezzogiorno Revisited
(Devon, UK: University of Exeter Press 1997) for an introduction to the specific questions that have been
raised. Raffaele Romanelli provides a similar, albeit more concise, analysis to the same effect in his
“Political Debate, Social History, and the Italian Borghesia: Changing Perspectives in Historical Reseach”
The Journal of Modern History 63.4 (1991), 717-739.
7
Luigi Villari, Italian Life in Town and Country (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons 1902), 187. My
emphasis.
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at this time combine to forge an adequate model for examining il Risorgimento and all of
its sentiments, benefits and discontents. Furthermore—much like the role of the Sicilian
peasantry in general—this critical moment represents something that is generally
neglected and amalgamated in the history of modern Italy.
This thesis thus serves as an original, albeit minute contribution to the school of
insightful revisionist historiography that has fortunately come to characterize many of the
recent interpretations of the fateful moments that saw the birth of the modern Italian state.
Much in the same temporal and theoretical vein as Denis Mack Smith’s famed work
Cavour and Garibaldi, this thesis provides a portrait of the previously neglected role of
the peasantry in il Risorgimento, or the “background to the struggle,” and the “raw
material on which Cavour and Garibaldi had to work in the decisive phase of this
revolution,” as Mack Smith has put it.8 The following contribution does not refute
traditional Marxist or revisionist hypotheses that the institution of the Piedmontese
constitution, the Statuto Albertino, further disenfranchised the already-impoverished
peasantry. However, it draws upon new sources to offer a systematic and detailed
analysis of the various liberal elements of Garibaldi’s prodictatorial regime, and explains
how each of its policies predated, but also worked in conjunction with the blanket
application of the Italian constitution and the localized elements in Sicily to further
distance the peasantry from the necessary resources to achieve social, political and
economic viability. At the same time, it seeks to emulate the microstoria popularized by
Italian historians of the 1960s and 1970s and accentuate the role of specific relationships,
networks, actors and individual decisions throughout this process, and thus highlight the
8

Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi 1860: A Study in Political Conflict (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press 1986), 2.
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critical elements of agency, causality and rational action that are generally missing from
previous approaches, whose logic too often falls into that of their characteristically
monolithic approach. What emerges from this study is a narrative that closely adheres to
Lucy Riall’s interpretation of the same period, aptly entitled “Ill-Contrived, Badly
Executed [and] . . .of no Avail’? Reform and its Impact in the Sicilian Latifondo (c.17701910),”9 for the brief period of Garidbaldi’s prodictatorship was nothing if not a tragic
lesson in administrative and governmental mismanagement and a case study in the
devastating effects of liberal reforms on local economies in Southern Italy. From their
attempts to implement and enforce a policy of conscription to the their approach
regarding land reform and the confiscation and misappropriation of ecclesiastical
property, Garibaldi’s regime was an egregious failure for which the Sicilian peasantry
paid the ultimate price of another century of poverty, anguish and ‘miseria.’ Contrary to
the liberal and Marxist interpretations of this movement, then, this thesis will conclude
that the violent reactions of the peasantry, the ‘plague’ of brigantaggio (‘brigandage’)
and the civil war that raged on the island for almost a decade after Italy’s political
unification can in no way be attributed to any sort of inherent rebelliousness or
lawlessness embedded in Sicilian culture. Rather, these events must be examined and
understood as the product of a collective social defense mechanism, of sorts, driven
forward by rational forces and the beginnings of a social consciousness amongst the
Sicilian peasantry.

Lucy Riall “Ill-Contrived, Badly Executed [and] . . .of no Avail’? Reform and its Impact in the Sicilian
Latifondo (c.1770-1910)” from Dal Lago, Enrico, and Rick Halpern. The American South and the Italian
Mezzogiorno: Essays in Comparative History. (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002).
9
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In drawing these conclusions, this thesis will consult a range of primary sources
often cited in early accounts and interpretations of the movement. Among these are
Garibaldi’s Secretary of State Francesco Crispi’s memoirs and the agricultural reports of
Sidney Sonnino and Leopoldo Franchetti, whose exhibition to Sicily in 1876 marked one
of the first official investigations into the dire social, economic and political conditions of
the island at this time. However, this study will also examine the diary of one of
Garibaldi’s troops and the correspondence of the British Consuls in Italy. These latter
documents will provide important context, as well as offer relatively detached, objective
and fresh accounts of the revolt and discord that raged in Sicily following the declaration
of the newly-united Kingdom of Italy. The range of revisionist secondary literatures cited
in this text works toward a similar end, and it is also to these sources that this thesis and
its author are heavily indebted.

7

I.

THE PEASANT CONDITION IN SICILY IN 1860

Geography and topography serve as two of the principal forces throughout
Sicily’s long history. The island covers an area of 9,830 square miles a mere two miles
off the tip of the boot of the Italian peninsula, and is the largest island in the
Mediterranean as well as what amounts to the basic epicenter of the great sea.10 Hailed
since antiquity for its raw beauty, Sicily’s position in the center of the Mediterranean has
functioned to cast the isle as a perennial setting in the many dramas that have played
themselves out upon the great European lake. Inevitably, too, its inhabitants often took
the form of the victims—the victim of a relentless villainy—a mass of oppressors coming
from every direction. Sicilian culture has retained souvenirs from each of these
encounters and subsequently developed into a rich and idiosyncratic cultural landscape of
nearly unparalleled proportions.11 However, these oppressors have left a much less
generous legacy in terms of the political and sociological effects of their respective
occupations, as a profound and renowned distrust of the state seemed to cement itself,
perhaps justifiably, within Sicilian culture in such a manner that persists even to this day.
This sentiment was omnipresent during il Risorgimento, and this pervasive notion has
come to be recognized as one of the most characteristic elements of the Sicilian

10

Figures taken from "Sicily" in the Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online.
Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 2012. Web. 30 Jun. 2012
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/542800/Sicily>.
11
For a recent attempt at accounting this storied past, see Sandra Benjamin’s Sicily: Three Thousand Years
of Human History (Hanover, NH: Steerforth 2006).
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condition. One could reasonably hypothesize that such a central location might have
resulted in Sicily flowering as a commercial hub, but this indeed was not the case, and
Sicily’s geopolitical location facilitated instead its exploitation by a variety of historical
actors.
The island’s topographical characteristics have been inextricably intertwined with
the region’s development as a sociopolitical unit and have historically lent themselves to
what many great civilizations have hoped to exploit for agricultural production and
surplus. The Romans most notoriously utilized the island as nothing more and nothing
less than their vast, living-and-breathing granary. Sicily’s agricultural output served as an
important component in the lifeblood of Roman and subsequent civilizations while also
providing for the subsistence of the Sicilian native population, as grain and wheat
products have long proven a staple of the Sicilian diet. Such prosperous and fruitful
practices slowly dwindled following the death of antiquity, however, and a very different
picture began to emerge. The content of the rich soil that housed the great Sicilian wheat
plains remained the same, as natural geological processes continued to wash the topsoil
down from the mountainous terrain in portions of the island, but a force of a very
different nature emerged to counteract the potential benefits of these natural processes
and gave birth to what one observer described as such:
. . .in the uplands of the interior one comes face to face with a sun-baked, treeless
and waterless soil which in its asperity and poverty seems to defy the will of
man—a will which, if present, is sometimes malevolent and bent upon the
perpetration of grave social injustice.12

12

Survey of Southern Italian Economy (Rome:SVIMEZ, 1950) 5. My italics
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Successive foreign occupations by Germanic, Muslim, French and Spanish
peoples gave birth to a class of resilient, opportunistic landowners who would come to
dominate the island for centuries.13 This human element of Sicily’s agricultural history
will serve as the focus of this portion of this essay, and the central question: with such
favorable geographical and topographical conditions that had allowed for the general
welfare and prosperity of its population for centuries, what happened to Sicily to give rise
to the deplorable state which became increasingly, and painfully, evident in modern
times? And furthermore, how was this state of affairs perpetuated and this practice
allowed to continue in the democratic epoch?

Lying at the very heart of these questions is the historical nature of agricultural
organization and production in Sicily. The vast, desolate stretches of land referred to as
the latifundia had, by the nineteenth century, firmly situated themselves in the rural
Sicilian landscape and rendered the island an oasis of static and essentially feudalist
agricultural practices which defied the dynamic modernizing forces surrounding it. So
all-encompassing and pervasive was the influence of the latifundia that some historians
have found them to dominate over half the island’s landscape.14 The notoriously low
yields and levels of productivity that accompanied these vast stretches of land prevailed,
and were understood by observers as ‘natural’ developments due to the historical lack of
capital and poor agricultural conditions on the island. Denis Mack Smith describes the
variety of agriculture practiced in Sicily as such:
See Benjamin’s Sicily for an introduction to this story, as well as a relatively concise overview of these
occupations and this historical development.
14
This estimated figure is taken from Denis Mack Smith’s “The Latifundia in Modern Sicilian History”
Proceedings of the British Academy 51 (1965): 85-123, 86.
13
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For centuries they had grown cereals alternating with rough pasture, and in such a
predatory manner that the land gave only one crop of wheat in three years and
usually less than nine bushels an acre. This low yield was though quite natural by
most farmers, for Sicily’s economic dilapidation over the centuries had been
generally accepted with the hopeless resignation of the Gattopardo, and it was
assumed that the laws of nature—climate, soil, lack of capital—left no alternative
to this extensive kind of agriculture.15
This sort of agricultural organization had crucial implications for not only
economic production, but also for the structure of the social hierarchies and systems of
power in the Sicilian countryside, which in turn ensured its continuity.
In the early nineteenth century, cultural and social resonance generated by the
French Revolution and the Napoleonic occupation of Italy resulted in an upsurge of
political awareness among the Italian middle class and from this ensued a series of
concurrent investigations into the feudal state of agricultural and social organization in
the Mezzogiorno.16 These investigations resulted in calls for land reform, particularly
from Professor Abbé Balsamo. Combined with the abolition of feudalism and heightened
levels of agricultural production during the British occupation of Sicily from 1806 to
1815, Balsamo’s reports exposed some of the damages wrought by the oppressive social
hierarchy.17 These investigations revealed a system of ownership wherein largely
absentee landlords and aristocrats, many of whom resided far away from their estates in
Palermo, Messina and at times as far as the mainland, reaped the benefits in prestige
Ibid., 87. Mack Smith is using the term ‘Gattopardo’ here as a reference to the protagonist in Giuseppe
Tomasi di Lampedusa’s famed work Il Gattopardo. Don Fabrizio Corbera, Prince of Salina, represents the
archetypal Sicilian landowner, whose habits of absenteeism and general neglect for his land are exemplars
of this group’s agricultural practices. Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa Il Gattopardo (Milan: Feltrinelli
2002).
16
Raymond Grew “Finding Social Capital: The French Revolution in Italy,” Journal of Interdisciplinary
History 29.3 (1999): 407-433. 426.
17
Mack Smith, “Latifundia in Modern Sicilian History,” 90-92.
15
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gained from owning such large tracts of land.18 They enforced this status quo through a
system of patronage, clientelism and often violence that ultimately perpetuated the drastic
disparities in wealth and equality in the ungoverned Sicilian interior. Central to the
maintenance and upkeep of this oppressive system was the parasitic third party of the
gabbellotti, the managers of the estates and ultimate “arbiters of the destiny of the rural
poor.”19 These individuals often subletted each tract of their landowners’ territory as
much as two or three times and required and enforced exorbitant rates of interest upon the
peasantry in such a manner that barely allowed for subsistence.20
This cyclical process yielded a most precarious and unstable state of living for the
peasantry, in which the typical risks assumed by nineteenth-century European farmers
represented the least of their concerns. One observer characterized this state of affairs as
such even at the beginning of the twentieth century:
The peasant has no security or tenure, and may be deprived of his holding on the
shortest notice, so that he has no interest in keeping the land in good condition;
and as his share is so small he has no incentive to work hard or well. He merely
works because he knows that his landlord will not actually let him die of hunger,
lest there should be no one to plough the fields.21

In this sense, the landowners had little interest in improving the lot of the
peasantry or the state of Sicilian agriculture. As Mack Smith states

18

Sidney Sonnino and Leopoldo Franchetti offer one of the first vivid accounts of this network in their
groundbreaking 1876 two-volume Parliamentary investigation La Sicilia nel 1876 (Firenze: 1877).
19
John Davis Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth Century Italy (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press International, 1988). 85.
20
Sonnino’s account offers a detailed analysis of these contracts and their regional and localized
manifestations throughout Sicily, referring to their arbiters and enforcers as “il grosso gabellotto” (243),
extracting and exploiting the labor of “il vero impresario dell’industria agricola . . .i contadini” (243).
21
Villari, Italian Life, 195.
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To them the land was a symbol of prestige and so could not lightly be transferred
to more active and capable hands. Instead of intensifying production to meet the
needs of a growing population, they preferred to extend still further up the
mountain-sides with the same superficial and semi-nomadic cultivation which
characterized the latifondi.22
These ‘latifondists’ thus enjoyed an anachronistically but distinctively feudal
dominance over the peasantry. Sonnino characterized these relations as such:
The latifondista was always baron-like, and not only in name: the way the worker
stood in relation to the landowner remained that of a vassal in relation to a feudal
landlord.23

The landowners employed and utilized the gabbellotti as a means of maintaining
the status quo in the countryside. These gabbellotti were often found occupying the ranks
of the middle classes in the hierarchy of Sicilian society, and their aspiring attitudes and
practices often mimicked those of their aristocratic employers. Sonnino goes on to
describe this class with great disdain.
the bourgeoisie, not very numerous, there like everywhere else, is hungry for
gain, and imitates the aristocratic classes only in their foolish vanity and lust for
domination.24

These individuals, many of whom would assume roles as mafiosi following
unification, combined with other members of the landowning classes to prevent (at times
violently) the emergence of a class of small landholders. In doing so, they prevented any

Mack Smith, “Latifundia in Modern Sicilian History,” 91.
Sidney Sonnino, La Sicilia nel 1876: I Contadini (Firenze: 1877). 176. Translated text: “Il latifondista
restò sempre barone, e non soltanto di nome: e nel sentimento generale la posizione del proprietario di
fronte al contadino, restò quella di feudatario di fronte a vassallo.” My italics.
24
Ibid., 176. Translated text: “Vi è poi la classe della borghesia, non molto numerosa, e là, come
dappertutto, avida di guadagno, e imitatrice della classe artistocratica soltanto nelle sue stolte vanità e nella
sua smania di prepotenza.”
22
23
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significant gains in the efforts for land reform enacted by the Spanish in 1792, the British
in 1812 and 1815 and the Bourbons in 1824 and 1841. These reforms sought to eradicate
the remnants of feudalistic practices, but ultimately only increased the legitimacy of these
relations in Sicilian society by privatizing property. 25 This allowed landowners and
gabbellotti to continue utilizing their strong-arm tactics and influence, and solidified the
latifundium and its exploitative and oppressive social dynamic at the center of Sicilian
society.
The subject of this thesis involves yet another instance of flawed state
intervention in 1860: one of the many failures or Garibaldi’s revolutionary regime
became the most exemplary case of gattopardismo.26 However, before moving forward, a
note on the nature of patron-client networks in rural society is necessary, as these sorts of
relationships and their impact on the behavior and condition of the peasantry function as
one of the principal determinants in the ineffectiveness of reform in the case of
Garibaldi’s prodictatorial regime.
John Duncan Powell claims that certain basic patterns of individual and group
relations emerge within peasant and agricultural societies which peasants attempt to use
as a means of gathering resources and capital in response to a foreign threat.27 These
include the maintenance of extensive kinship networks and the establishment of clientele

Denis Mack Smith’s work referenced above provides evidence and testimony to this fact in a more
extensive fashion. 85-123.
26
Gattopardismo, literally translated as “leopardism,” is again a reference to Giuseppe Tomasi di
Lampedusa’s aforementioned work Il Gattopardo in which he illustrates in beautiful prose the dynamics of
social change at the time of il Risorgimento, summed up in the character Tancredi’s infamous line, “Se
vogliamo che tutto rimanga com'è bisogna che tutto cambi.”
27
John Duncan Powell “Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics,” American Political Science Review 64.2
(1970): 411-425; 411-412.
25

14

and patronage systems with those of differing wealth or status.28 Duncan Powell also
asserts that state centralization and market expansion serve as the two processes most
responsible for the flourishing of these relations, and that such liberal elements further
transform these relationships and systems into politicized power-brokering mechanisms
by which the patron in the relationship can extract the continuing political support and
material dependency of the client.29 These generalized characteristics of peasant societies
are clearly evident in the Sicilian case, as these power mechanisms had become firmly
entrenched within Sicily’s socioeconomic hierarchy by the time the movement for Italian
unity began. In this manner, the Sicilian peasants were effectively captured within a
vicious and inescapable cycle of poverty and oppression, and their only apparent rational
economic response was to remain within it, borrowing money in times of need from their
patrons at exploitative levels of interest that combined with the debts suffered from their
original contracts. Sonnino describes the state of the peasantry and their suffering at the
hands of this usura, unchanged ten years after Garibaldi’s expedition, in the bleakest
terms:
Usury renders impossible for the Sicilian peasant any savings, any improvement
of his lot; and worse still, it keeps him in a continuous state of legal subservience
and moral depression, and it takes away every liberty, every sense of true dignity.
The Sicilian peasant is almost constantly indebted, either to his master or to
strangers. . . And whoever gathers per fas aut nefas, just a nest egg of some
several hundred lire, is able not to work at all, live in idleness and in vice, usury
exercises an unbridled influence on the peasants: a useful member of society
become ipso facto a dangerous parasite to the social body.30
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However, a second rational option and course of action existed for the Sicilian
contadino (‘peasant’): revolt. In 1860, the failure of past agrarian reform combined with
these endless systems and networks of social servitude, as well as with a great and
renewed detest for the brutal Bourbon police systems, to forge a vehement popular hatred
for all systems of authority and the beginnings of a mass movement in Sicily
unprecedented since the Sicilian Vespers in the thirteenth century. Similar to the Vespers,
which were a reaction against oppressive French authority, the Sicilian countryside arose
in 1860 in what appeared to the world as a desperate cry for help and deliverance, and
what appeared to all of those Italian patriots and partisans seeking Italian unification to be
a revolutionary powder keg to be tapped and exploited for their own means and ends.

depressione morale, gli toglie ogni libertà, ogni sentimento della propria dignità. Il contadino siciliano è
quasi costatemente indebitato, o verso il padrone o verso estranei . . .D’altra parte basta a chiunque di aver
raccolto per fas aut nefas, un gruzzolo di qualche centinaio di lire, per non lavorare più affatto, e per vivere
nell’ozio e nel vizio esercitando l’usura la più sfrenata sulla classe campagnuola: costui da membro utile
della società, diventa issofatto un parassita dannoso del corpo sociale.” Italics in text.
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II.

The Expedition of I Mille and the Rise of the Revolutionary Peasantry

The City was beset with numerous troops awaiting, but in vain, the expected
descent of the peasants from the mountains in full force. The Signal of revolt was
given from the Gancia convent, the bell of which loudly rung brought together a
motley and ill armed crowd wearing tri-coloured cockards and crying “Viva
Italia e Vittorio Emmanuele!31

Such a riveting account of revolution and insurrection as recalled by John
Goodwin, the British Consul at Palermo, certainly gives color to the grand narrative of
the Risorgimento and its origins in the countryside of Palermo. However, this report
neglects and obscures some of the basic facts of the peasant revolts occurring in Sicily at
this time, and furthermore exemplifies and foreshadows the egregious politicizing of such
a courageous display for the means and ends of the liberal revolutionary regime. In fact,
this revolt in particular, and the rise of the peasantry in April 1860, were both devoid of
any sense of a unified political program, particularly of one that involved the King of
Sardinia. This basic fact holds a number of great implications for not only the purposes of
this essay, but also for the course and development of the Italian historiography of the
Risorgimento on both sides of the Marxist-liberal divide, as both the movement and the
myth became associated with a fabricated sense of unified public opinion in favor of
Italian unity under Victor Emmanuel II, when indeed the reality was quite the contrary.

31

Letter from Consul Goodwin. Public Records Office (PRO). FO 70/322. 210-211.

17

A number of nineteenth-century politicians as well as more recent historians
agreed with Goodwin’s account of the revolt of the Sicilian peasantry in 1860.32 Indeed,
to the objective viewer, and to the avid, idealistic nineteenth-century revolutionary, the
appearance of such popular participation would not be unexpected, as Napoleon had
effectively transplanted the ideals of the French Revolution throughout much of Western
European continent by this time, particularly throughout the Italian peninsula, and the
memories of 1848 were quite fresh.33 However, those ideas of liberté, egalité, fraternité
and their legacy of civic engagement and social and political consciousness did not
develop in the southern provinces as they did in northern Italy.34 Likewise, the
revolutionary vanguards in past uprisings (such as 1848) had failed to mobilize the Italian
peasantry as a revolutionary force in any way that would have itself provoked or
influenced the revolt of 1860.35 Furthermore, the widespread illiteracy and relative
physical isolation of the peasants of the Sicilian interior meant that the promulgation and
dissemination of any political program in the countryside was next to impossible.36 Thus,
it can be concluded that the revolt of the Sicilian peasantry in 1860 involved social and
material grievances arising out of mounting frustration at the seemingly inexorable plight
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in which the peasants found themselves. It was the hated grist-tax, il macinato (which had
already started one revolution in 184837), the crippling consequences of faulty Bourbon
agrarian reform,38 the despised gabbellotti, the idle, decadent aristocracy, and the brutal
Bourbon authorities to which all of the peasant’s hatred was geared. The peasants’
motives were not to be found in any sort of grandiose liberal discourse or in any party
doctrine. This revolt was a brutal cry and a struggle for survival, and the first stage in the
development of fledgling social and political consciousness. As this thesis will argue,
Garibaldi would not make the mistake of failing to initially engage the peasantry on these
grounds, with promises of bread and land-- promises which would, due to no particular
fault of Garibaldi’s, go largely unfulfilled.
Thus the narrative of il Risorgimento begins, when on April 4, 1860, Palermo
exploded in a month long period of turmoil and insurrection that eventually climaxed in
Garibaldi’s legendary Spedizione dei Mille (‘Expedition of the Thousand’) and the
beginning of the most dramatic and decisive stage of the whole Risorgimento. Revolt
having almost completely engulfed the whole of western Sicily following the famous
‘Gancia’ insurrection (as described above by British Consul Goodwin),39 Garibaldi’s
initially quixotic and piratical venture quickly found success in the state of anarchy that
37
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prevailed across this half of the isle. This succession of unexpected victories, which
began in Marsala and gained momentum in Salemi and Calatafimi before finally arriving
to Palermo,40 drew the undivided attention of a number of European leaders, particularly
Camillo Benso Count of Cavour, the shrewd Piedmontese diplomat who watched
fearfully as his relentless adversary Garibaldi won the hearts and arms of the Sicilian
insurgents.41 The question arises, as it surely did for Cavour at this time: how could
Garibaldi so effectively mobilize such a formidable revolutionary mass? And what sort of
implications would this mobilization have for the greater success of Garibaldi’s campaign
and for the whole of the effort for Italian unification?
The tactical and political strategies employed by Garibaldi and his regime took
the simple form of several concessions and promises, the nature of which this essay will
examine in the section below. However, it stands as of the utmost importance to
acknowledge the sudden resurgence in enthusiasm for Garibaldi’s endeavor and his army,
and the manner in which this excitement aided I Mille and garnered not only the
temporary support of the Italian peasantry, but that of a number of international entities.

Sandra Benjamin’s Sicily offers a concise account of the logistical points of the expedition on pages 306314. For a more detailed account see the extract from a diary in Crispi’s Memoirs which provides almost
up-to-the-minute updates of the affair.
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The effect of a resurgent nationalism on the Italian was apparent, even if
hyperbolic in some instances, and varied in strength from region to region. Francesco
Crispi’s memoirs declare the upsurge in such romantic terms as these:
. . .a great flame of enthusiasm swept the peninsula. The impulse to hasten thither,
to have a part in the glory, to help in some way, seized one and all, for all now
knew that the time had come when Italy would indeed be made.42

Encouragement and assistance, however veiled and relatively dubious in their
manifestations, arrived from all corners of the Western world.43 Most notably, such
assistance and general sympathy for the Italian cause came from Britain.44 The British
had grown increasingly impatient with the repressive means pursued by the Bourbons as
they attempted to maintain order on the island, as well as (and perhaps most importantly)
the manner in which these practices interfered with British economic interests in the
area.45 British vessels thus lay silently and strategically in the harbor at Marsala, with the
likely intention of safeguarding the mission should it be intercepted by the Bourbons.46
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Most notorious among contemporary observers as well as histories composed
since then, though, was Garibaldi’s ability to appeal and inspire courage and the flames
of Italian nationalism within the common man, as seen in the declarations of undying
love and loyalty of his soldiers47 as well as the actions of those commoners he interacted
with and influenced. This exchange will be viewed more in depth below, as Garibaldi’s
successful landing and his first proclamation represents one of his first appeals to the
peasantry, in an attempt to depict his political program as one principally aimed at
mitigating their material anguish. For now, though, it is important solely to acknowledge
the presence and effectiveness of this charismatic ability, and the extent to which
Garibaldi and his regime were able to generate mass appeal and manufacture Italian
nationalism. These notions are of the utmost importance and centrality to this essay, as
they contributed to the ability of Cavour’s liberal regime to wholly and ultimately hijack
the unification effort for itself by playing upon these themes to amalgamate the myriad of
diverse interests of the inhabitants of Sicily in 1860.

An excerpt from poetic private Giuseppe Abba’s famed The Diary of One of Garibaldi’s Thousand
exemplifies such adoration: “What could we, a few thousand men, have done if he had not been our leader?
Could all the Generals of Italy rolled into one, with all their skill, have done what he has done? There was
need of a heart like his, perhaps of a head like his, and that face that makes one think of Moses, of
Charlemagne, of some Warrior Christ! You only had to see him to be won over.” Giuseppe Cesare Abba,
Trans. E.R. Vincent The Diary of one of Garibaldi’s Thousand (London: Oxford University Press, 1962)
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III.

Garibaldi’s Dictatorship and its Deficiencies

‘You mean, one territory; as far as the people are concerned, one or many, they are
bound to suffer and they go on suffering and I have not heard that you want to make them
happy.’
‘Of course! The people will have liberty and education———‘
‘Is that all?’ broke in the friar. ‘Liberty is not bread, nor is education. Perhaps
these things suffice for you Piedmontese but not for us here.’
‘Well. What do you want then?’
‘War! We want war, not war against the Bourbons only, but against all
oppressors, great and small, who are not only to be found at court but in every city, in
every hamlet.’48

This conversation between one of Garibaldi’s Mille, Giuseppe Abba, and a
Sicilian friar, encapsulates the sort of misplaced liberal, idealistic rhetoric heralded by the
revolutionary regime, as these wrongfully imposed notions of nineteenth-century
liberalism served to overshadow and discredit the many voices, opinions and desires of
the Sicilian populace. However ignorant Abba the romantic revolutionary was of the state
of affairs in Sicily, as well as of the position of the peasantry therein, Garibaldi’s
prodictatorial regime was not. Immediately upon the regime’s consolidation, the new
rulers sought an explicit policy to win over the hearts and swords of the peasantry by
issuing proclamations making promises of bread and land. These promises, however,
directly conflicted with and were ultimately subordinated to the aim deemed by the
regime more critical to the success of the revolutionary effort: the support of the
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landowning classes. This portion of this essay concerns itself primarily with those critical
months and the decisions and oft-contradictory policies sought by the newly-declared
prodictatorial regime of Garibaldi, his unwavering Sicilian aide and Secretary of State
Francesco Crispi, and the multitude of allied administrative actors and agents underneath
them. Although operating under potentially irreconcilable external constraints, these
figures effectively exploited the Sicilian peasantry as a revolutionary mass in order to
expel the Bourbons, yet ultimately favored the interests of the landed elites to such an
extent that the peasantry were left with no material gain from their massive contributions
to the effort for Italian unification.
To provide for an adequate and thorough examination of this process, this essay
will present the historical narrative first so as to illustrate the nature and origins of the
policy sought by the prodictatorial administration and to introduce the individual actors
who played a part in its construction and implementation. This essay will then further
analyze various pieces of legislation and demonstrate that indeed, they elicited no
improvement in status of the peasantry, but instead further separated the members of this
peasant class from any means or resources that could provide for social or economic
mobility.

Mere hours after the crews of the Piemonte and the Lombardo disembarked at
Marsala around noontime of May 11, 1860, Garibaldi and Crispi summoned a gathering
of the municipal council of Marsala at the town hall where the two issued the first of a
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number of decrees and proclamations declaring Garibaldi’s status as Dictator of Sicily.
Crispi’s memoirs record the “invitation” as such:
Proclaim Victor Emmanuel King of Italy, and his representative, Garibaldi,
Dictator of Sicily. Invite all cities and towns of the Island to follow your example.
Your proclamation will be the starting point of the political transformation of our
country.49
These calls to action would be heard days later in Salemi and Calatafimi, and
from these epicenters calls to expel the Bourbons reverberated throughout the island.
Chaos erupted, administrative bodies disintegrated entirely, and those individuals
representing any brand of authority found themselves in mortal peril and at the mercy of
the anarchic climate of the isle.50 This state of disorder would later come to influence a
number of the decrees and policies of the prodictatorial government, and ultimately
functioned as one of the most insurmountable impediments to effective administration
and reform. At the time, though, the victory on May 15 in Calatafimi against a sizeable
Bourbon force gave credibility to Garibaldi’s regime as a legitimate alternative to the
oppressive Bourbons, and with this victory the charge of government and administration
began. The first set of dictatorial decrees were issued on May 17, and in this manner the
process of transforming the social revolt of the Italian peasantry into a political revolution
for a unified Italy officially began.
Garibaldi’s first dictatorial decree created the office of Secretary of State and
appointed Crispi to the post.51 On the same day, Crispi, demonstrating sufficient
knowledge and awareness of the failure in organizational structure of the 1848-49
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revolt,52 developed the outlines of the new administration. Crispi passed laws pertaining
to conscription for all of those capable of bearing arms between the ages of seventeen and
fifty and, most critically, abolished the tax on flour and duty on cereals, thus directly
appealing to the peasantry so as to solicit their confidence and support.53 A day later,
while marching toward the ultimate military goal of Palermo, Crispi submitted to
Garibaldi a decree for the appointment of a Council of War, which would serve as a court
martial to try any crimes committed by soldiers or civilians during the revolution, thus
“safeguarding the honor of the revolution.”54 However, as this essay will argue, this body
concurrently served to legitimize arbitrary acts of coercion and violence enacted at its
own discretion, particularly to the effect of punishing acts against private property and
ensuring the support of the landowners.55 This act represented the first in a series of
decrees which displayed a gradual change in direction of administrative policy and intent,
which would only be further altered following the victory at Palermo on May 27.
Garibaldi’s troops caught the Bourbons off guard, and, after much street-fighting,
erecting of barricades and bombardment, the insurgents had decisively driven back the
troops of Francis II by that afternoon.56 That same day, and the day after, Crispi presented
for Garibaldi’s approval various acts promulgating the creation of a Comitato generale
(‘General Committee’) and its division into various subcommittees dedicated to the
management of the municipality of Palermo.57 On June 2 and June 4, Crispi issued his
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last conciliatory gestures and promises to the masses, ensuring their unfaltering support
in favor of the revolutionary regime, proclaiming on June 2 that
whoever has fought for his country shall receive his part of the communal lands to
be divided among the inhabitants, in accordance with the law (of 1849, now reestablished), without being obliged to draw lots for the same, and that in case
where the soldier has been killed, this right shall pass to his heirs.58
On June 4, Crispi issued a decree assuring the nurturing, education and reparation
by the state of the children, widows and soldiers who incurred personal losses during
their participation in the revolutionary effort.59 Crispi also abolished the residual feudal
elements of Sicilian society such as the title of Eccellenza (‘Excellence’) and the custom
of hand-kissing which served as symbolic impediments to the progress of the peasantry.60
These acts and promises were met with jubilation and renewed dedication from the now
‘revolutionary’ peasantry and ‘volunteers.’ On June 6, the Bourbon officials signed the
armistice, rendering the peasantry’s military role a decisive one in what Denis Mack
Smith characterized as “Italy’s most notable military success in the whole
risorgimento.”61
Tommaso Palamenghi-Crispi, Francesco’s nephew and the editor of his memoirs,
characterizes the capitulation of Palermo and the passing of these pieces of legislation as
the climax of the first stage of the revolution, as the Garibaldinian administration was
now faced with a much more difficult task, that of ensuring order and creating the proper
climate for pursuing their political aims on the island and the peninsula. Crispi’s nephew
describes the regime as successful in its initial stages, and reveals the way it had

58

Ibid., 222
Ibid., 223.
60
Ibid., 224.
61
Mack Smith, Victor, 195.
59

27

effectively gained the favor of the revolutionary mass as a catalyst in the victory at
Palermo;
Up to the second of June, Crispi had impersonated the government, legislating
and exercising full power. This unity of direction and initiative was of inestimable
value during that first period of revolution, when radical and decisive measures
were necessary in order to establish the new political system upon the ruins of the
odious system of the past. The country’s acquiescence in the action of Garibaldi
and his Thousand, which could not have been dispensed with, was all the more
enthusiastic and steadfast because the people immediately felt the hand of
government in the removal of the tax on bread, felt that their needs were
understood, knew that their losses would be made good, and protection afforded
them. And all this they owed to the Dictatorship and to Crispi, who lent it
intellect, heart and energy.62
Thus, Garibaldi’s charisma and Crispi’s political preparedness and decisiveness
had secured the confidence and support of the urban and rural masses, and in doing so
had secured the success of the effort to expel the Bourbons from Sicily. Indeed, for the
most part, Garibaldi’s provisional government initially met with general popular consent,
as the regime and its administration stood as one “which the people all acknowledge and
obey with pleasure.”63 As Denis Mack Smith puts it, “It was long since anyone had been
able to say so much of any government in Sicily.”64
Following these decrees, however, and beginning in early June, Crispi began
employing a vastly different policy-making strategy, as reflected in a statement he would
make much later in life:
Revolutions are of course made with whatever people you have available. The
important thing for a statesman is to know how to get rid of certain elements
subsequently and send them home. Sometimes their natural home is prison.65
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Such contempt for the peasantry and the urban masses and their undeniable
contributions to the nationalist cause became increasingly evident in the regime’s
policies. Many of the administration’s actions came to reflect those of a police state
which favored order rather than social revolution. The regime implemented such a policy
in order to appease and win the support of the landed elites, thus preventing the
development of counter-revolutionary Bourbonist sentiments and ensuring the
‘efficiency’ of political administration. While the steps detailed below and the policies
certainly appear ‘necessary,’ in this respect, one must also note their damaging
consequences in implicitly subordinating the interests of those individuals who the
landowners exploited for their profits to their particular understanding of a united Italy.
This change in policy came as a result of the apparent and relative dominion over Sicily
achieved by the victory at Palermo, but also in light of new international developments.
Crispi now had to concern himself with Cavour’s impending attempts to hijack the now
politicized revolution for the liberal camp, which distracted him from any sort of
sympathetic social tendencies or intentions Garibaldi’s prodictatorial regime may have
possessed.
Indeed, it should be noted that Crispi may have held some convictions for the
cause of social revolution, or at the very least reform,66 being that he was indeed a
revolutionary democrat. However, any of these concerns seem to have been swept aside
when Cavour’s encroachment on administrative affairs in Sicily began. The divisiveness
and subsequent mismanagement and discord created by the Cavourian elements and
to the point that “Now, to hold the Sicilians, it is necessary, for the present at least, to respect their
traditions, good or bad as the case may be, using them to the best possible advantage the cause of the
national Risorgimento to which we are all working.” Crispi, Memoirs, 66.
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agents, most specifically the antagonistic relationship between Crispi and Cavourian
Minister Giuseppe La Farina, represents the first of a number of catalysts that drew
Garibaldi’s attention away from advancing the social cause of the peasantry and from
enacting any sort of effective legislation whatsoever. Those all-too-familiar echoes of the
1848-49 revolution could be heard, in this instance, as those nightmarish political
divisions which resulted in a brutal Bourbon counterrevolution seemed to be reemerging
in similar forms.67 In many respects, the beginnings of the political movement in 1860
mirrored those of 1848, as the revolt born out of social concerns brought to light political
differences which fatally compromised the movement’s success.68 These memories only
increased the sense of urgency surrounding the effort for Italian unification.
Just a day after the Bourbons signed the armistice in Palermo, Cavour’s envoy La
Farina arrived on the shores of Sicily and immediately began to sow the seeds of discord,
rallying around him a party opposed to the administration of Crispi, whom he despised
and envied as a result of Crispi’s close relationship with Garibaldi.69 A dispatch headed
for Turin, dated three days after La Farina’s arrival, although rife with faulty assertions,
accounts and assumptions, serves to demonstrate both the aims of Turin and the vanity
and malice with which they would be pursued. La Farina spoke of his former friend and
fellow exile Crispi’s “utter incapacity” and the people’s gross disregard and disrespect for
the government, claiming that “No one believes it can endure, and its authority is laughed
at.”70 La Farina only further damaged his own credibility as a truthful observer, claiming
that “all come to me for advice and direction. In the streets I am greeted with enthusiasm,
67
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while no one thinks of saluting those in power,”71 and that “disorder is great, and might
easily discourage one not born in Sicily, but I feel myself sufficiently strong to conquer
it.”72 One cannot help but marvel at the audacity and explicit pretension of such a figure,
particularly when he ends his rash dispatch with a statement to the point that “I cannot
allow Sicily to be ruined by machinations of rascally or foolhardy individuals,”73 as if the
whole of the effort for unification depended on the participation of this man. However, as
this essay will demonstrate, in some ways it did.
All accounts indicate that Garibaldi received La Farina with coldness, giving him
every assurance that his administration was in control and that his services were indeed,
unnecessary.74 La Farina received scant attention from the dictator until a month after his
arrival, when Cavour’s agent had brought about enough discord and popular discontent
with his propaganda and libelous accusations of Crispi that Garibaldi dismissed him from
Sicily. The official release, as reported in a July 21, 1860 issue of The Economist states
that Garibaldi banned La Farina for
. . .conspiring against the actual order of things. The Government, which is
vigilant for the public tranquility, and should not be the least disturbed, could not
any longer tolerate the presence amongst us of such individuals, who had come
here with culpable intentions.75
However, La Farina had succeeded in his mission, and this fact cannot be
overstated. By conducting a largely successful smear campaign against Crispi and his
government, La Farina firmly implanted the plausibility of annexation to Piedmont firmly
within the popular Sicilian consciousness, going so far as to persuade the civic council of
71
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Palermo to register an official motion for annexation (which an infuriated Garibaldi in
turn firmly rejected).76 Nonetheless, La Farina was a significant impediment to effective
administration in Sicily, and in this way La Farina himself gave some truth to his
accusations of governmental inefficiency, leading to a distinct decrease in support for the
prodictatorial regime. Likewise, his ability to capitalize upon and proliferate the rumors
of ‘Mazzinianism’ and ‘class war’ circulating among the urban elites in the streets of
Palermo, inspired enough fear and discontent to ultimately deal a deafening blow to the
credibility and ability of Garibaldi’s government. This led to Crispi’s forced resignation
on June 27, and although July 7 marked La Farina’s permanent disappearance from the
island, an irreparable wound had been inflicted upon the democratic cause.
Although Crispi remained largely influential during the subsequent Secretariat of
Depretis, and indeed small successes were had by the democratic front in July, any
republican cause at this point was lost. With Garibaldi being forced to leave Palermo to
attend to military matters on the isle and the mainland, whereby the island lost the man
around whom the Risorgimento was fixated, the political climate in Sicily became
increasingly polarized, and the isle’s administration all but forgotten. A complete analysis
of this greater political and diplomatic narrative stands outside of the scope and breadth
of this essay, but the most critical element to understanding the nature of these
proceedings is the role played by La Farina, whose subliminal and destructive influence
in Palermo served as a catalyst in preventing the effectiveness by which the Garibaldinian
administration could carry out reforms or enforce laws during that critical month of June
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1860.77 Scarcely covered in scholarship on the Risorgimento, La Farina in this respect
deserves recognition as one of the most influential figures in the whole of the effort for
Italian unification.

Garibaldi’s administration was also forced to act within the external constraint of
a gross lack of finances and resources. Lack of sufficient ammunition haunted Garibaldi’s
troops from the beginning,78 and upon the capitulation of Palermo this translated into an
inability to effectively enforce and ensure the upkeep of law and order on the isle,
particularly when all arms available had been diverted to the liberation front. Abolition of
the macinato, however critical for the gathering of peasant revolutionary support, meant
the elimination of what had been the largest source of governmental revenue on the island
for the Bourbons.79 This simple quandary in and of itself is an adequate example of the
sort of inherently contradictory policy sought by Garibaldi’s regime. Reintroducing this
policy, or attempting to levy any other sort of new taxation, would have proved
disastrous, and certainly unsuccessful, as the lack of arms or general semblance of order
prevented the establishment of any legal authority to which the Sicilians could be
expected to respond. On June 9, Crispi, in light of the barren state of the Exchequer in
Palermo, attempted to pass such tax measures to benefit those incurring losses due to the
revolution and Bourbon bombardment.80 But, as much of the city had been destroyed by
this bombardment, and normal commercial activity not yet restored, it can be reasonably
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assumed that these policies were merely symbolic, at best, and perhaps a last effort at
encouraging the Sicilians. Given the severe poverty still being endured by the mass of the
populace, and the uncertainty and fear of class war felt by the elites in light of the
revolution, charitable donations to the nationalist cause were nonexistent.

Bearing these political and economic limitations in mind, following the sealing of
the armistice at Palermo on May 29 (and what essentially amounted to that of the entire
island other than Messina), the provisional government embarked on a radically different
path in terms of policy. As mentioned previously, this strategy departed from the earlier
one pursued during the ‘radical’ stage of the revolution. Crispi, and even more so his
successor to the secretariat, Agostino Depretis, now understood that their initial policy
represented one in which the two aims of mobilizing the support of the masses, on one
hand, and ensuring order, political success, and the prevention of Bourbon
counterrevolution, on the other, represented a contradiction in practice, and that the
interests of the landed class of rural elites needed to be weighed more heavily if success
was to be achieved. In practice, this policy translated into the creation of a National
Guard, the institution of ‘mobile columns’ of volunteers and carabinieri to police the
countryside, and a period of unprecedented violence, military justice and repression in the
Sicilian interior. At times indistinguishable from the roaming bands of deserters and
bandits plaguing and wreaking havoc throughout the island, and at other times utilized as
mere extensions of the power of local elites, these forces clashed with centuries-old, local
family disputes and local rivalries in what became a bloody civil war. Simply put, one
could not easily distinguish from the small armies now employed by the fearful
34

landowners, the legal authorities of the newly established regime, and the brigantaggio
(‘brigandage’) now rampant in the countryside.
This policy of coercion began on May 29, when upon the capitulation of Palermo
many of the laws proclaimed in Salemi on May 14 were instituted. These included those
laws pertinent to the leva (conscription) and the construction of the Council of War and
the national militia. Capital punishment was also mandated for murder as well as theft
and pillaging, the latter two acts, it should be noted, being related to private property, and
thus only relevant for those landowners who could suffer such losses.81 Popular
discontent swelled, and became directed against all means of authority, including the new
government, as the peasantry realized that the promises made by Garibaldi would go
unfulfilled. Whereas previously Garibaldi had been able to control and even direct the
frustrations of the peasantry, he now perpetuated their discontent and gave it new cause.
The introduction of liberal free-trade legislation later would only exacerbate these
tensions and heighten the number of riots and popular demonstrations.82 Crispi’s nephew,
sympathetic as his bias most certainly is, claims that from this point forward, “Crispi
never failed to impress upon the authorities he was gradually instating that all attempts on
property must be punished with relentless severity.”83
Most demonstrative and notorious of these cases of military justice stands as that
of Bronte, an insurgency crushed by one of Garibaldi’s most ruthless generals, Nino
Bixio, then serving directly on the Council of War. Bixio, a man characterized by British
Consul Goodwin at Palermo as “for harshness and severity is unexampled in Sicilian
81
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history”84 embarked upon a bloodthirsty purge of the villages surrounding Mount Etna in
early August and arrived at Bronte, where, according to Abba, “terrible rioting had
broken out,” resulting in “arson, vendettas, fearful orgies” and “division of property,”
(the latter of which should be noted as bearing strong resemblance to those promises
made by Garibaldi a mere three months before).85 Bixio took swift action, declared
Bronte in a state of siege, confiscated all arms under pain of death, disbanded all forms of
municipal organization, issued a war tax (unlikely to be affordable or paid), and
sentenced the allegedly guilty parties to a court martial, resulting in what some accounts
declare six executions86 and others, as many as thirty.87 Abba describes among those
executed a sixty-year-old man and “cultured, gentle young men in red shirts; doctors,
artists and the like.”88 The historian and Italian deputy Giuseppe Ferrari would later
characterize these individuals as “the first victims of a social war.”89 Bixio went on to
enact similar punishments in Randazzo, Castiglione, Regalbuto, Centorbi and other
municipalities,90 warranting this description by Abba:
They called him a savage brute, but they dared not do more. However far the
fortunes of war take us away, the terror of witnessing this man’s tempestuous
wrath will suffice to keep the population of Etna quiet. If not, this is what he has
written: ‘We won’t waste words; either you keep orderly and quiet or, in the name
of Justice and Country, we’ll destroy you as enemies of humanity.’91
Bixio’s dangerous jump to declare the interests of the country (and his particular
understanding of the country) as the same as those of humanity represents, in this case, a
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perilous and fatal view that would have direct consequences for the Sicilian peasantry.
These matters were of little importance to the provisional government, though. More vital
was the appeasement of those landed classes and assurance of “a complete restoration of
good order”92 necessary for securing the success and permanence of the effort for
unification. Doubtless certain circumstances and cases emerged when such force was
necessary, but one cannot help but speculate as to how many cases of unwarranted
wanton violence occurred from such pretences when in reality circumstances may have
been much as those described by Abba, when upon arriving upon the scene of an
apparent bread riot at a baker’s shop, he related:
I said to Bozzani, ‘We’d better hurry before they sack it.’ On reaching it,
however, we saw there was no rioting; people were taking their loaves, paying for
them, and making way for others. A gentleman told us that his family had eaten
nothing since the previous day as they had been caught by the revolution without
provisions in the house.93
Regardless, as the next decade reflects, these measures, similar to all of those
implemented by the regime, proved largely ineffective, as chaos remained the order of
the day.

The creation of the National Guards did not mitigate this problem, as the
responsibility of their construction was left largely to those officials appointed to the
heads of local councils by Crispi (a concerted and in this context relatively successful
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effort at winning the favor of local elites which will be explored later in this essay).94
This resulted in the bestowing of legal authority and legitimacy to both the pre-existing
agrarian power structures and the violent bands of thugs they employed to assure order.95
Referencing the Garibaldi’s administrative priorities at this time, Denis Mack Smith
states:
His first need was for stable government, and hence he welcomed that the
National Guard should develop out of private security organizations employed by
the landowners, even though this might eventually mean capitulation to one side
in the social struggle which was now cutting across the political fight for
freedom.96
These measures thus only effectively fomented the already anarchic state of the
interior, as all of these localized loyalties and clientelist patronage networks clashed with
the brigands in what manifested itself as an essential class war which would eventually
give birth to what we now refer to as the mafia. At this juncture, it should be noted that
these were indeed rational responses and reactions to the imposition of these laws rather
than behavioral deviations as the meridionalisti might presume (more on this below). In
any event, despite the use of brute repression, the Garibaldinian administration was still
unable to enforce any sort of legislation it concocted, regardless of its intent or the
audience to which it catered, the peasantry or the landed elites. This utter failure
manifested itself most apparently in the government’s embarrassing inability to enforce
the leva.
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One of the first pieces of legislation passed by the provisional government, this
attempt to recruit a militia was met with open defiance and in some instances blatant
disregard from the beginning. In fact, many scholars credit this attempt as one of the
foremost causes of the popular discontent that plagued the isle.97 Crispi’s biased nephew
declares the unwillingness to serve the state as something engrained within Sicilian
culture, claiming that “The Sicilians were not accustomed to compulsory service, and
considered it an intolerable burden.”98 This essentialist and generalizing explanation does
not seem to hold up, though, as a number of peasants had aided the expedition in
Palermo, and support did not begin to wane until July, when all hope for social reform
was lost.99 In any event, this edict met with so much repulsion and neglect that the
government was finally forced to make concessions and modifications to the law in the
hopes of gaining any support at all. Crispi, still hoping to salvage any authority and pride
the administration had left, wrote to one of his governors:
The regulations concerning conscription must be obeyed. We are willing,
however, to modify the clauses that are at variance with popular prejudice.
Substitution will be permitted and only sons exempted. I demand one thing only,
that these modifications be made to appear as already inherent to the law, and not
as concessions on the part of the government, whose authority must be
safeguarded.100
Unfortunately, Crispi would never learn that arrogance and disillusionment do not
make for effective administration, and the above concession and the provisional
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government’s inability to enforce conscription on any level, serve as exemplary cases of
this Italian patriot’s administrative denial and mismanagement.

These policies of the provisional government combined with fundamental
elements of nineteenth-century liberal reforms in a manner that proved fatal for the
peasantry. That is to say, Garibaldi’s administrators, in the following instances, was not
guilty per se of blatantly and consciously subordinating the needs of the peasantry for
reasons of greater political significance, but were instead merely naïve, in a sense, as to
the historical circumstances and condition of the Sicilian peasantry. However, this
naivety and the subsequent misplaced imposition of liberal educational, religious and
agricultural reforms resulted in equally catastrophic consequences for the peasantry as
did those policies of intentional coercion and oppression. It was in light of the failure of
these reforms that the notion of ‘Piedmontization’ began to appear incompatible with the
case of Sicily and particularly with that of the Sicilian peasant. At the very least, these
efforts at instituting liberal reforms arrived too late in the revolutionary process. The
provisional government’s attempts at educating the masses prove extremely relevant, in
this case.
The Casati law established compulsory education along Piedmontese lines, but
proved irreconcilable with the peasant condition in Sicily. Given the chaotic state of the
interior, and the lack of effective economic or agricultural reform (detailed more below),
the peasant child remained on the farm with his or her family, continuing in assisting and
aiding the family’s meager attempts at subsistence just as he or she had before the
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revolution. Evidence of this can be seen in Sonnino and Franchetti’s report, as in 1871,
87 percent of the total population of Sicily was illiterate, a percentage that, by Sonnino’s
estimate, was entirely composed of peasants.101 In the same respect, as in the past, the
landowner and agriculturist had no vested interest in improving the state of his human
capital as a means of increasing agricultural production through education. As Denis
Mack Smith characterizes it: “latifondisti not only were content with a 2 per cent return
on their money; they often seem to have made it a point of class pride to leave their
estates derelict and barren.”102 Furthermore, any attempts at educating the masses would
only lead to revolt. As Sonnino puts it:

Was it perhaps this neglect by the upper class only due to carelessness and
indifference, or did it rather stem from the instinctive consciousness that
instruction given to the peasant in their present conditions would only ferment
discontent and could become a stimulant to the spirit of rebellion and future
disruptions?103
Thus, the liberal notion of mass education proved incompatible with the preexisting state of the Sicilian peasantry, as no effective social or economic legislation had
been passed to liberate these individuals from their responsibilities at home and their
feeble attempts at subsistence. To make matters worse, any charitable institutions through
which the peasantry could have attained these sorts of resources were abolished with the
passing of liberal, anti-clerical reforms. These measures were to be found among the first
of Crispi’s edicts, as he dismissed and abolished the Society of Jesus and the Order of

101

Sonnino, 196.
Denis Mack Smith, History of Sicily, 458.
103
Sonnino, 196-197. Translated text: “È forse questa trascuranza delle classi agiate solo effeto di
spensieratezza e d’indifferenza, oppure non dipende piuttosto dalla istintiva coscienza che l’istruzione data
al villano nelle condizioni attuali non farebbe che l’ufficio di lievito al malcontento, e potrebbe diventare
uno stimolo allo spirito di ribellione, ed un fomite di future sconvolgimenti?”
102

41

Redemptorists from the island, “in consideration of the fact that the Jesuits and
Liguorians were the most steadfast supporters of despotism during the unhappy period of
Bourbon occupation.”104 He then nationalized their vast holdings of land, which covered
a tenth of Sicily.105 Garibaldi and Crispi, both notorious anti-Catholics,106 instituted these
reforms with such stringent sentiments of anti-clericalism that they neglected to account
for the rather idiosyncratic, pervasive and vital positions of the priests in Sicilian society,
and the role they played in initially supporting the peasants’ social revolts.107 This
relationship differed markedly from the perceptions held by both Garibaldi and the
liberals, undoubtedly influenced by their experiences and observations of the parasitic
clergy in other, wealthier parts of Italy. Even Abba, young and innocent as his musings
are, held this disdain for the Church, particularly the Augustinian monks, stating;
They did the honours of their monastery dresses in black cassocks, sleek and
greasy. The monastery is secluded, a tranquil backwater, a place to grow fat in.
The monks are like trees in a garden whose soil drains all the good from the rest
of the village.108
Sonnino paints a vastly different picture of the priest in Sicily, hailing him as one
of the only social services available to the island’s populace.
The priest is the only person who consoles him [the worker or peasant] with
words of affection and charity; at least, if he doesn’t help, sympathizes with him
when he suffers; treats him like a man, and talks to him of future justice that will
make up for the present injustices. Religious worship is the most sacred part of
peasant life: apart from that he only knows work, sweat and misery.109
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Sonnino goes further to express his liberal opinions in regards to the harmful
effects of religious superstition in general and the manner in which these customs and the
Church will “forever rule the masses.”110 However, he acknowledges that, given the lack
of sufficient social and economic reform in Sicily, the liberation from these forces
represented a temporary impossibility, and that the state had only served to remove the
material benefits of these charitable institutions. This meant the jobs of an estimated
15,000 laymen alone in Palermo, as well as those services of the Church that catered to
the poor and destitute, were lost.111
The policy aimed at Church and the nationalization of its lands is inextricable
from the land reform undertaken by the Garibaldinian prodictatorship. This project’s
utterly egregious failure generated grave social and economic consequences that fatally
undermined all of the regime’s liberalizing efforts and ultimately sealed the fate of the
Sicilian peasantry. This agrarian program consisted of several radical measures and
phases. These edicts were first issued on June 2, and thus probably bore the same stamp
as the other promises made to the revolutionary peasantry at this time. However, if put
into practice with the proper accompaniments, this program had the potential to be
effective, and could have avoided infringing on the established rights of the landed elites,
with great implications. Denis Mack Smith regards it as such:
agrarian reform, quite apart from considerations of political expediency and social
justice, would have been an indispensable prerequisite for making the revolution
of 1860-1 into the real turning-point of Sicilian history which many people had
hoped.112
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Needless to say, it was not put into practice in such a manner, as the elements of
‘Piedmontization’ seeped in to destroy such prospects, and the program only made
matters worse in Sicily. The first phase of reform promulgated the redistribution of
Crown land among the peasantry on June 2.113 The island’s new prodictator, Antonio
Mordini, initiated an even more radical and concrete measure in October, allowing for the
transfer of 230,000 hectares of Church and Crown land into leases meant to provide for a
class of smallholders to emerge.114 Cavour’s eventual political coup d’état in October
thwarted this effort though. Realizing these lands could be auctioned off at higher prices,
the new political class enlarged the units of land to be sold. Abuses and gross
monopolization of holdings ensured, as financial gains enjoyed precedence over the
assurance of holdings or justice for the peasants.115 It is not hard to imagine how the
violent means of the gabellotti and the nascent mafia (in most cases indistinguishable
from one another) and the established clientelist and patronage systems came into play, in
this regard. Any peasants who were willing and able to stand up to these pressures were
without the adequate credit facilities to do so.116 As one scholar states, “A piece of land is
only a necessary, but not sufficicent, condition to allow the peasant to escape the world of
la misera.”117 The result: the consolidation and preservation of the pre-existing power
structures of the Sicilian agrarian hierarchy. Sonnino and Franchetti demonstrate in detail
the proceedings of the auctions in their reports, but they can be accurately be summed up
in Sonnino’s introductory statement:
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with rents and falsified contracts, here just as in the communal allotments of the
whole of Sicily, all of the lots went into the hands of the rich landowners. As for
the land surveyed by the ecclesiastical board, there was never any need for
falsification, and in the whole of the island, all of the surveyed lands went to the
rich landowners and capitalists.118
The only way to perhaps reconcile these liberalizing, profit-seeking measures by
the state with the interests of the peasantry would have been the reintroduction of the
‘promiscuous rights’ of grazing, hunting and wood-collecting on the common lands. As
Sonnino describes,
For the peasant landowner, the small holder, and also the simple laborer, these
rights were a veritable wealth, and a source of well-being all the more invaluable
because they were not affected by the passing crisis, because these rights were
inherently communal and inalienable.119
However, with all of Cavour’s emphasis on privatization, there was no hope for
these prospects. In the end, all of these lands passed on to the class which now, according
to Sonnino, “horded all of the things once deemed as communal.”120 Again, this failure
revolves around the similar quandary facing the measures pertinent to compulsory
education (which were undoubtedly well-intentioned) involving the nature of the Sicilian
ruling class, and the manner in which the liberal regime prized their political consent and
the content of their pocketbooks above all else. In sum, Lucy Riall details the harsh
reality of the situation:
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As a result, the chances of land reform succeeding in Sicily depended on a group
of men whose entire livelihood depended on the reform failing. Agricultural
diversification was entrusted to class grown rich on grain, who drew a substantial
profit from rent and who would perceive little material benefit from
commercializing their crop. Men whose wealth and security derived from ‘the
frenzied exploitation’ of a debt-ridden labour force were expected to allocate land
to the peasantry, thus freeing them from exploitation. The disappointing, even
disastrous, results of land reform in Sicily can largely be traced to this
fundamental fallacy.121

Finally, the act of legislatively bestowing legitimacy to this powerful, oppressive
class and the injustices suffered by the peasants that resulted from this process represent
the most critical elements to understanding the consequences of Garibaldi’s provisional
government in Sicily. Crispi’s administrative delegation of authority gave political
legitimacy to these traditional agrarian hierarchies, and transformed them into
powerbrokers who cemented the fate of the Sicilian peasantry. This action represented
the final nail in the coffin for the chances of Sicilian democracy and popular
participation. This, it should be noted, was a conscious decision by the provisional
government, to favor the interests of the elites and to appoint them to various
administrative posts to gain their political backing. Undoubtedly, the chaotic, anarchic
state of the island factored greatly into this decision. The rural elites seemed at this point
to be the only element able to influence, control and subdue the rebellious activity in the
countryside. However, this logic operates on the premise and a priori notions that the
radical factions of the Sicilian populace were incapable of independently adhering to and
participating in governmental procedures. Scant evidence exists that would support this
hypothesis, as in the failed political experiment of 1848 all radical elements (even those
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from the upper classes) were excluded from the interim parliament’s proceedings.122
Likewise, speeches and reports given in the Italian Chamber of Deputies in 1861 indicate
that violent crimes subsided following the capitulation of Palermo and only intensified
when the peasantry began to comprehend the new trajectory of the regime’s policy in late
June and July of 1860.123 Crispi’s choice to favor the landed elites thus represented the
triumph of faulty logic which favored expedience and subservience over liberty and
equality.
It was in this general line of reasoning that on May 17, Crispi appointed
governors to all twenty-four districts of the island, and bestowed upon them all
administrative authority in their respective lands.124 These structures bore much similarity
to the Piedmontese administrative system.125 The majority of these appointments proved
themselves to be poor decisions on the part of Crispi, to say the absolute least. Nepotism,
the pursuance of personal vendettas and rivalries, and gross abuses of power of all sorts
became the norm in such a way that “gravely compromised every principle of
bureaucratic rationality and centralized control”126 and gave unprecedented power to
these local elites. As Franchetti reports:
The extremely small class that had already dominated in large part public and
private affairs, came necessarily to power with a new authority and influence
given by the Government, and the more its power grew the more is used it to
assume the characteristics of a direct monopoly that exclusively benefited
themselves.127
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Why, then, would Crispi choose such figures to serve as leaders in the new,
liberal State? As John Davis says, “to ensure the political success of the mission.”128 Such
a decision, and its devastating social outcome, showcases the consequences of this sort of
pragmatic politics. Crispi’s faulty appointments thus combined with Depretis and
Mordini’s centralizing and ‘Piedmontizing’ efforts to perpetuate the rise and prevalence a
wealthy rural political class and a decisive and self-serving voice in the forging of the
new state. These sorts of political entities, based on largely on clientelist networks and
reliant on largely-illiterate peasant constituencies, consistently prove to be what one
scholar deems ‘accommodating’ “flexible” and “pragmatic.”129 In this case, these phrases
function as mere euphemisms for the harsh realities that were ‘parasitic,’ ‘opportunistic’
and ‘undemocratic.’ These elements quickly became so powerful and so pervasive that
not even the Italian State could check their power, and instead the state itself became an
instrument of the wealthy. Franchetti, in infamous terms, offers this morbid eulogy of the
death of liberty and democracy, and the failure of the new Italian State:
This is how the Government, in searching for the favor of the local elements, saw
its concessions turn into its loss, and where they sought to use the dominant
classes as an instrument, the government became instead an instrument
themselves; to the point that at the times they seemed to have any power, it
signified they were controlled by a local party.130
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This transition of power came with its expected consequences for the Sicilian
peasantry. Once in place, successive local governments abandoned all calls for land or
social reform that would have benefitted the peasantry.131 In fact, they tended to do just
the opposite, and local taxes on land were all but eradicated, whereas those on food were
exponentially raised, the burden of which fell upon the peasantry.132 Plans for the
development of public works programs were abandoned, and instead geared toward the
creation of lavish theatres and status symbols in the name and under the auspices of the
wealthy landowners.133 These actions resulted from the power, authority and legitimacy
ultimately and originally bestowed upon them by the Garibaldinian administration. Years
later in 1877, Leopoldo Franchetti would try to call attention in the Italian Parliament to
these continuing injustices in these compelling terms:
And the more a ministry boasts of being liberal and progressive and governing
according to the will of the country, the more it governs Sicily in every detail
according to the interests of the extremely small class that dominates there. . .134
This state of affairs would be solidified and cemented at the center of Sicilian and
Italian politics when the plebiscite for annexation to the kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia
was held on October 21, an event with legal and social ramifications that would lead to
almost a decade of bloody, civil conflict and a full-fledged class war on the island, whose
consequences can be seen to this day.
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IV.

The Plebiscite, the ‘Piedmontization’ of Sicily and Civil War

Away with all political strife! No party has the right to force upon our country
any one particular set of social guarantees. This right belongs to the nation alone,
and when the nation has conquered it may be trusted to establish just that
constitution which will secure to it the fruits of victory for ever.135
Francesco Crispi, Memoirs

These romantic words written by Crispi mere months earlier undoubtedly seemed
in October as though they were transcribed in another lifetime. By this time, the radical
cause was all but lost. Garibaldi now faced a mandate to hand over his spoils to Victor
Emmanuel II, who was to be named the first king of a united Italy, a decision the
disenchanted revolutionary announced on October 15.136 The plebiscite in Sicily,
conducted six days later and resulting in a resounding ‘sì’, put the first of a series of
finishing touches on the shape of the new Italian state. However, this vote represented a
mere formality and another step in what would become a prolonged and extensive
process of unification that in many ways remains incomplete. The façade of Italian unity
had been effectively created, but did not fit as comfortably upon some regions of the
peninsula as it did others, Sicily being a case in point. With this façade’s imposition as
well as that of its accompanying laws and regulations came an intensified level of
upheaval and unrest on the island to such an extent that martial law and a ‘state of siege’
135
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had to be declared twice in order to supress the conflict.137 The purpose of this section is
thus to examine the nature of the plebiscite in Sicily, the beginnings of the attempted
‘Piedmontization’ of the island, and the rational responses (of both the peasantry and
other groups) and long-term consequences that resulted from this process.

The days leading up to October 15, 1860, marked some of the most tense in the
whole Risorgimento. Crispi, still influencing political affairs on the island to the best of
his ability, delayed the declaration of a plebiscite until the latest possible moment,
awaiting Garibaldi’s response to Victor Emmanuel’s ‘invitation’ to join a free and united
Italy.138 Following the general’s affirmative response, word was sent to all corners of the
island that a plebiscite was to be conducted six days later. Registered Sicilian voters were
to respond with either a ‘sì’ or a ‘no’ to the proposition that ‘the Sicilian people desire to
form an integral part of Italy one and indivisible under Victor Emanuel as their
constitutional king.’139 Purposefully crafted without reference to ‘annexation’ of any sort
and carried through in a manner so as to elicit the unanimous response desired by the
Piedmontese regime, the plebiscite represented a mere formality, in this respect. For this
reason, Cavour and his underlings gave little thought to extending ‘universal suffrage’ to
all literate Sicilians. While such an action could have appeared perilous in its application
to such an uneducated, easily-influenced populace, Cavour by this time understood
Sicilian politics as a mere extension of the networks of power, patronage and clientelism
so deeply entrenched in the island’s sociological landscape. Likewise, voting was
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performed publicly in the town centers for all to see, and in this manner subject to every
kind of external influence.140 It takes little imagination to understand how this translated
and intensified in the smaller, more remote villages. Denis Mack Smith description places
the few qualified Sicilian peasant voters in context:
Outside the big towns, in areas where villages were still feudal and where
landowners had made up their minds that Piedmont offered the best hope of
restoring order, the publicity which surrounded the voting meant an almost
compulsory ‘sì’. In some places, for instance Trapani. . . the ignorant peasantry
fled to the mountains, under the impression that the voting was only a plot to
inveigle them into an ambush and then press them for military service.141
In this sense, all that was required in order to achieve the intended results of the
plebiscite was the proper and successful production of an elaborate show, of sorts, and a
hearty celebration to follow. The liberal regime succeeded, in this regard, and the results
yielded a nearly unanimous vote in favor of annexation. Mack Smith places the final vote
in Sicily at 432,053 to 667, with 238 of the 292 voting districts having no negative votes
whatsoever.142 A few days of widespread public jubilation followed, even if its
participants did not know or understand the cause of their celebration. As one observer
recalled: “the affirmative vote meant to the great majority the inauguration of an age of
economic and social prosperity: no one then imagined it could conceal a new slavery.”143
This simple fact was soon realized, as upon the implementation of the
Piedmontese constitution, the Statuto Albertino, the reforms the majority of the Sicilian
populace had grown to detest under the Garibaldinian administration were given
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legitimacy and a permanence that they never had before. The widespread response to the
reinstitution of these policies took on that of a state of unprecedented revolt and (now that
Italy existed as an independent country) ‘civil war.’ Brigantaggio flourished, and any
semblance of order or government disappeared from the countryside. The disenfranchised
Sicilian peasants geared their discontent and defiance at the same targets it had before the
plebiscite, such as the officials and institutions supporting the despised leva. However,
their response now took on the form of a reaction against the liberal elements embedded
in the Piedmontese constitution, including free trade legislation and new systems of
taxation. The disbanding of the Bourbon army as well as Garibaldi’s revolutionary force
only exacerbated these tensions and increased the level of disorder prevalent on the
island.144 In order to adequately account for and understand the nature of these reactions,
each of these elements and occurrences must be analyzed individually, beginning with
the policy of conscription.
As this essay has demonstrated, the leva occupied a particular place in the Sicilian
public imagination as an exemplary manifestation of their treatment and exploitation at
the hands of the state, and thus made for a prime target and outlet for their anger and
frustration. Secretary Crispi’s concessions and modifications to its enforcement had
appeased the Sicilians to some extent, but these alterations were thrown out upon the
implementation of the new constitution in October. Protests ensued, and the new
government had little success in enforcing this mandate over the course of the next
decade. As early as December, speeches in the Italian Chamber of Deputies forecasted
the prospects of the law’s implementation as such:
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As for the ‘Leva’ in Sicily, I believe that we shall meet with still greater
difficulties in it accomplishment than at Naples. I say this with regret, for when I
was in Sicily I thought matters were in vain to facilitate these operations; but for
some time past, a degree of agitation has been produced. . .I hope that this
agitation will soon subside, that we may without any serious difficulties effect the
‘Leva’ and that we may exhibit to Europe this grand fact that the Southern
Provinces have contributed to the Army of Italy upwards of 45 or 50 thousand
recruits in one year. . .I trust that when this agitation is appeased, the ‘Leva’ will
be carried out. I trust in the patriotism of Sicilians.145
As the next ten years would demonstrate, this trust would prove to be misplaced,
as Sicilians, particularly those in the countryside, still did not have an accurate
conceptualization of the workings of the new Italian state or their roles or responsibilities
within it. Their only past experiences with the state featured it as an oppressor which
constantly fed upon and demanded vital human and material resources of its
constituency. The oft-cited quotatioin of Italian author Carlo Levi’s from his Cristo si è
fermato a Eboli (‘Christ Stopped at Eboli’) could not be more applicable, in this respect,
as “Nothing had ever come [from Rome] but the tax collector . . .”146 This sentiment
preoccupied Sicilian brigands to an almost fanatical degree.147
The sustained and legitimized enforcement of methods of taxation favoring
landed elites and members of the parliament continued to spark public outrage. As John
Davis describes this was the “greatest single cause of rural discontent,” and that
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. . . nowhere was the nature of the compromises forced on the new state more
evident than in the continuation of a fiscal system that discriminated strongly
against the countryside and the rural population. Under pressure from the landed
interests, the new state adopted a fiscal system in the 1860s that was based on a
land tax that weighed more heavily on small farms than on larger estates, while
the rural population bore the brunt of indirect consumption taxes which were
levied on most basic necessities.148
This combined with a governmental interest to prevent urban disorder to bring the
bulk of the weight of taxation on the rural population.149 Finally, the decision in 1868 to
reinstitute the macinato, whose abolition had given life to the peasantry as a
revolutionary force less than a decade earlier, ignited a flame of discontent that would not
be easily quelled.150
New taxes worked with other fiscal and commercial policies to fatally
compromise the position of the Sicilian peasantry in the new Kingdom of Italy. The
disappearance of the Bourbon protective tariffs and the extension of Piedmontese free
trade legislation crippled the Sicilian economy on a number of levels. The few large-scale
industries that did exist and provided a means to supplement the meager incomes of the
peasants, such as those found in cotton textile mills, were decimated.151 The effects on
local trade and commerce were felt in both the urban and rural spheres, as artisans and
smallholders could not keep up with such drastic changes and the pressures that
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accompanied the sudden rise in prices.152 This resulted in workers’ strikes in the cities
and widespread bread riots in the countryside.153
These uprisings and the general state of unrest that prevailed on the island dealt a
massive blow to the credibility of the new Italian state, and thus legitimized the regime’s
brutal use of their newfound authority in mitigating the conflict. In 1862, the Italian
government instated the Pica Law, bestowing upon the local authorities military powers
of arrest and detention, powers which were abused by the elites who occupied these
positions to an egregious extent.154 Summary executions, the besieging of entire villages,
torture and the taking of hostages became commonplace, as the authorities sought to
eradicate the scourge of brigantaggio.155
However, closer examination reveals that brigantaggio, whose connotations in
Italian Parliament became those of a plague that had infested and wrought havoc on the
Sicilian interior, was in fact welcomed by all segments of the island’s population. In fact,
the individual brigand, whether he hailed from the peasant class or the urban working
class, assumed the characteristics of a certain popular hero for both the peasants and the
landed elites, depending on the spatial context.156 As Sonnino evocatively demonstrates:
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And is it perhaps surprising that the brigand finds trusted and devoted friends
everywhere? While the landowners aid him out of fear or to use him as an
instrument of their passions, the peasants are his natural allies, because the
brigand, embodying the popular sentiment, taxes the landowner and is generous to
the poor, and thus represents both a proud protest against social oppression and an
affirmation of their individual dignity.157
In his study of “primitive” and “archaic” social movements among “pre-political”
people in Western and Southern Europe, Eric Hobsbawm underscores these reactionary
figures and movements as those characteristic of “social banditry,” and the predecessors
of modern mass political movements. He elaborates upon this concept as follows;
Social banditry, a universal and virtually unchanging phenomenon, is little more
than endemic peasant protest against oppression and poverty: a cry for vengeance
on the rich and the oppressors, a vague dream of some curb upon them, a righting
of individual wrongs. Its ambitions are modest: a traditional world in which men
are justly dealt with, not a new and perfect world. It becomes epidemic rather than
endemic when a peasant society which knows of no better means of self-defense
is in a condition of abnormal tension and disruption.158
While scholarship on social movements such as these has been has been relatively
limited, Hobsbawm hails these sorts of spontaneous outbursts as the “pre-history of
modern labour and peasants movements,” and in this sense worthy of serious
introspection and analysis. However, while Hobsbawm’s theorizations provide a
necessary groundwork and foundation for further discussion, his Marxist schema and
theoretical framework does not regard such protests against oppression and poverty as
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political acts in and of themselves. The Sicilian peasants were not “pre-political” people,
but—on the contrary—they were very political, albeit in different, simpler ways than
urban-based, modern mass labor movements.

The other responses to this ‘Piedmontization’ were many and varied in terms of
their lasting consequences for the fate of Sicily and the new Italian state. While the
majority of disenfranchised Sicilians took to the mountains, and revolted in spontaneous
fashion against the government, other reactions took on a more organized and at times
distinctively politicized dimension. Hobsbawm differentiates between these two
responses as being “revolutionary” and “reformist,” the latter of which refers to the
group’s willingness to “accept the general framework of an institution or social
arrangement, but consider it capable of improvement or, where abuses have crept in,
reform.”159 The emergence and organization of the mafia as a means of protecting
property and restoring order to the countryside easily fits within this definition, and is in
fact cited by Hobsbawm on a number of occasions as the prime example of such a
movement. An early Italian sociologist describes the development of the mafia as “a sort
of vast mutual-help society, to which an indefinite number of people belong, and whose
object is to acquire influence and power by any means.”160 Recruited from the middling
ranks of society, particularly from the class of gabbellotti (already skilled in the brutal
tactics of intimidation), these organizations came to play a massive role in the affairs of
liberal Italy. As one group of scholars states:
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. . .the state relied on them [the Mafiosi], only pretending to police their
unauthorized use of violence. Thereafter, a succession of governing regimes in
Italy looked the other way as mafia ‘families’ proliferated, especially along the
‘bandit corridor’ that extended through Sicily’s western mountains and in the
commercially rich orchard district surrounding Palermo. . .161
In many of the towns, these families and organizations dominated communal
councils, controlled the awarding of public contracts, bribed and intimidated judges,
swayed elections, and ultimately monopolized the administration of liberty and justice in
Sicily.162 This parasitic class thus became a crucial piece in the governmental apparatus
of the new Italian state in such a resilient manner that its influence can still be seen to this
day.163
The second form of ‘revolutionary’ response beyond that of spontaneous social
banditry was a number of attempted Bourbon and Republican counterrevolutions
orchestrated by various individuals which occurred frequently throughout the bottom half
of the Italian peninsula for the first five years after Italian unification. The disturbances in
the Basilicata region in Southern Italy were the foremost of the pro-Bourbon movements,
as a couple of bands succeeded in dismissing authorities and occupying cities for brief
periods of time.164 Bourbonist demonstrations were principally limited to the mainland,
as the regime had never enjoyed much support in Sicily. The disturbances in Sicily took
on a more ‘red’ or ‘Mazzinian’ character, though the legendary Italian nationalist’s
involvement in these disturbances is dubious, at best. However, as John Davis states, it
was Mazzini’s republicanism that served as the “first and foremost the politics of the
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discontented”165 throughout Italy both before and after unificatioin. Major “Mazzinian”
disturbances took place in Bologna, Florence and Naples, among other large cities in
peninsular Italy.166 Counterrevolutionary republicanism enjoyed particularly fertile
ground in Sicily among the middle and lower classes who rightly felt as though they had
not received their due promises from Italian unification. Davis points out the populism
embedded in Mazzinian republicanism and its utility as an inclusive counterrevolutionary
ideology:
The combination of nationalism, anti-establishment protest, virulent anticlericalism together with a firm emphasis on the value of inter-class cooperation
made republicanism a suitably vague yet comprehensive catch-all programme that
was capable of encompassing many disparate discontents and resentments.167
These sentiments and discontents came to a head in Palermo in 1866, as the city
exploded in a state of revolt unseen since the legendary Gancia insurrection six years
earlier that had acted as the sparkplug for il Risorgimento. A British consul offers one of
the most authoritative accounts of the event, beginning with a description laid forth by a
Paris newspaper:
‘It is proof of serious discontent in Sicily,’ says a Times Paris Correspondent,
‘that a city of 200,000 inhabitants, with a garrison of 15, 000 men allowed itself to
be taken possession of by two or three thousand armed brigands’ . . . The union
with Italy and the approach of war brought about an unpopular change.
Exemption from the ‘Leva’ was discontinued, and consumption duties were
enhanced . . . It was resolved at private meetings to effect a revolt by means of
brigands and outlaws . . . Early in the morning of Sunday the 16th Sept. about 400
armed men came down and took the city by surprise. Entering the smaller gates
and overpowering the guards, they pushed on unresisted to the centre of the city.
By 9 a.m. all the gates except one which adjoined the royal palace were in their
hands; by noon they had broken up the pavement and erected barricades, by 8
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o’clock they had occupied certain monasteries with the consent or connivances of
their inmates. The P.O., the military hospital and, after two days finally the Town
Hall fell into their power. . . Reinforced by traitorous guards, and by the rabble of
the town until their number was swollen to some thousands . . . For six days the
insurgents were masters of the city, on the 7th they were driven out.168
Although these counterrevolutions were ultimately prevented, and order restored,
these attempts at the very least reveal some critical implications as to the divisiveness of
public opinion in Sicily, the general lack of regard and respect for the new Italian
government and an exemplary case study of what Hobsbawm refers to as “the problem of
how primitive social movements ‘adapt’ to modern conditions,”169 or, in this case, their
imposition.

The final and perhaps most devastating response to the ‘Piedmontization’ of
Sicily was the first and largest instance of permanent emigration seen in the island’s
history. Estimated in 1876 to be 300,000 a year from the country as a whole, the bulk of
this flight came from Sicily and other regions where the new forms of taxation devastated
agricultural industry and where poverty served as the most influential factor.170 Much of
the potential source of human capital on the island thus departed for brighter shores in
North and South America, where socioeconomic mobility appeared more possible.171
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moral quality or inherent rebelliousness of the people,172 but must be located within the
context of the application of this utterly detrimental liberal legislation. ‘Piedmontization’
gave way to the formation of criminal organizations such as the mafia in Sicily and the
former Neapolitan provinces on the mainland, bloody counterrevolutions, social revolt,
brutal reprisals and a massive flight of emigrants, all of which would prove enduring in
their consequences. This civil war and the formation of the mafia thus cannot be
attributed to the peculiarities and particularities of Sicily and its inhabitants as so much
essentialist scholarship of various meridionalisti would have its readers believe. Rather,
one must examine the way the island has been treated and administered, as these
occurrences and organizations were born in relation and out of a reaction to the state and
the imposition of this legislation that worsened the already dire state of poverty of the
Sicilian peasants and their urban counterparts.

One can thus deduce these developments in rural Sicily as direct, and even
rational responses to one underlying cause: poverty. As Luigi Villari states:
In Sicily, however, it [crime] still flourishes, and every year a very large number
of murders and robberies are committed by bands of armed freebooters, who
infest the rural districts. The motives of the brigands are not always robbery;
revenge and local feuds are often as much answerable for the murders as the
desire of gain. Still, want is at the bottom of this form of crime, as poverty is the
chief cause of the social and moral degradation of the people of Sicily . . .173
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Conclusion

. . . all the phenomena studied in this book belong to the world of people who
neither write nor read many books—often because they are illiterate—who are
rarely known by name to anybody except their friends, and then often only by a
nickname, who are normally inarticulate, and rarely understood even when they
express themselves. Moreover, they are pre-political people who have not yet
found, or only begun to find, a specific language in which to express their
aspirations about the world. Though their movements are thus in many respects
blind and groping, by the standards of modern ones, they are neither unimportant
nor marginal.174
E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels

They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented.175
Karl Marx, The Eighteenth
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte

Neither side of the liberal-Marxist divide that has characterized the historiography
of the Italian Risorgimento has had much to say about the Sicilian peasantry’s catalyzing
role in the effort for unification. The former, lengthy passage above, extracted from
Hobsbawm’s larger work on the subject of ‘archaic’ social movements, represents one of
the first attempts by a Marxist from the West to engage this sector of the population on
revolutionary terms, as Marx himself had no patience (at least, not until his later years)
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for this conservative force “incapable,” as he states, “of enforcing their class interest.”176
The latter excerpt, of course, is one of the few and expectedly one of the most wellknown lines the legendary German thinker dedicated to the demographic this thesis has
been particularly concerned with. Popularized to the point of academic cliché by Said’s
prolific classic Orientalism, neither this line, nor Hobsbawm’s passage that precedes it
could prove more applicable in this case, for while a concerted aim of this work has been
to give voice or at least shed light upon the experience of the group of people Luigi
Villari called “the best element of the [Italian] population,”177 it has sadly failed, in this
respect. Besides the intrinsic and seemingly insurmountable impediments to cultural
representation so skillfully posed by Said, the generally deplorable state of the archives in
Italy, the limited number of sources at hand for this thesis’s undergraduate composer, and
the basic nonexistence of primary source materials applicable for the purposes of
documenting the case of an illiterate subject have all prevented serious discussion.
However, it is the author’s sincerest hope that this brief essay has at least drawn some
attention to this forgotten and most marginalized of groups in history, as time, modernity
and generally irresponsible scholarship have seemed to pass them over and relegate these
individuals to the dry confines and (at best) the margins and footnotes of Italy’s grandiose
political histories.

However, while this essay has failed in fully illustrating and representing the
whole of the life, experience and condition of the Sicilian peasant at the time of Italian
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unification, it has at least offered magnification of the various consciously-imposed
liberal administrative and legislative reforms that, combined with age-old networks of
power and patronage in the Sicilian countryside, to perpetuate the impoverished condition
of the peasantry. In this respect, this work has at least assisted in some manner in the
chipping-away of the thick façade of meridionalismo that has plagued far too many
studies of the Mezzogiorno and its myriad of problems. Sicily and Sicilians are not
‘incapable of modernization,’ and if they did prove incapable at this particular juncture in
history, it was only as a result of what can be called a ‘collective social defense
mechanism,’ of sorts, which has developed in response to centuries of foreign domination
of the island. This mechanism consisted (or consists, rather) of sophisticated networks of
patronage and clientelism, a profound distrust of the state and its appendages and a great
value placed on the family, the latter of which so many meridionalisti have referred to as
‘amoral familism.’178 This collective social defense mechanism can also account for the
lack of economic and industrial development in the South, and in turn the consequences
of these deficiencies on the northern and national economies. As one author notes:
This particular system of social integration [patronage and clientelism]
had a limiting effect not only on the diffusion of capitalism in the south
but also on the national accumulation of industrial capital, as monetary
consumption was held back by the persistently miserable conditions of the
landless peasants and capital investment obtained better returns outside the
country or went into land speculation.179

One must question the use of the word “amoral” in particular, here, as the only code of ethics being
broken is that which is being imposed by an opportunistic, shrewd, malicious, and duplicitous liberal
regime whose only concern was to impose a capitalist framework in order to better their own economic and
political position.
179
Enzo Mingione “Italy: The Resurgence of Regionalism” International Affairs 69.2 (1993): 305-318.
313.
178

65

In the same manner, this mechanism and its activation upon being ‘Piedmontized’
can account for the proliferation of crime that persists to this day in both Sicily and the
whole of the Mezzogiorno, and the ugly, essentialist stereotypes of individual criminality
that accompany this basic trend. Again, the same scholar, though writing decades later,
illustrates its effects
. . .the reality of the situation is that the patronage-oriented system of
social integration, an employment and economic structure strongly
characterized by irregular arrangements, untenured jobs, black labour
market activities and youth unemployment, and the lack of adequate legal
protection for all forms of social interaction together form an
extraordinarily fertile ground for the growth of crime.180
Crime and corruption have now become basic facts of life in Sicily and southern
Italy. However, these conditions, as well as those characteristics of meridionalismo listed
above can in no way be credited to Sicilian or Southern Italian ‘difference,’
‘distinctiveness’ or ‘backwardness,’ but only to the actions of the state that have
historically generated these responses.

This thesis has also served to at least partially fill a large gap in the revisionist
approach to understanding the Risorgimento.181 Indeed, while much of this revisionist
scholarship has uncovered and espoused economically “rational” actions and reactions as
some of the principal determinants in the shaping of modern Italy, its focus has been
primarily on the decisions of the elite, the landowners and the opportunisti like the mafia,
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rather than the peasantry. Without a doubt, if nothing else this essay has determined that
the general unrest during Garibaldi’s prodictatorship and the civil war that raged
throughout Sicily between 1860 and 1866, can be directly attributed to “rational”
reactions of a group and sectors of the population whose only means of bettering and
improving their economic condition was indeed revolt or, as Hobsbawm calls it, by
exercising “social banditry.” Whether these individual or collective reactions were to the
leva, the macinato, or ‘Piedmontization,’ in general, they can in every respect be viewed
as being determined by ‘rational’ thought processes, deductions and understandings of
their social situation, and can in this sense be seen as the development of a social
consciousness. Hobsbawm’s contribution is critical, here, as his understanding of these
social movements and the process of examining “the adaptation of popular agitations to a
modern capitalist economy,”182 in addition to his body of work at large, have proven
immensely applicable, influential and inspiring in the development of both this thesis and
its author. However, one must take serious issue with Hobsbawm’s use of “pre-political,”
which if nothing else represents the profound limitations inherent in the Marxist
theoretical framework in this particular instance. Hobsbawm, the Marxists and Marx
himself failed to realize the “political” nature of peasant protest, as the peasantry as a
group does not fit within their limited understanding of what constitutes a social class. In
this respect, “pre-political” must be exorcised from the quotation that opens this section,
for while the Italian peasantry were a “people who have not yet found, or only begun to
find, a specific language in which to express their aspirations,” their struggle to find the
language and framework within which to act out their desires—though “blind and
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groping”—was in and of itself a politically significant act.183 Perhaps it is fitting that this
work departs and ends its conversation of the peasantry with a quotation of Hobsbawm’s:
The reader of this book is not required to sympathize with revolutionaries,
let alone primitive ones. He is merely advised to recognize that they exist,
and that there have been at least some revolutions which have profoundly
transformed society, though not necessarily in the way planned by
revolutionaries, or as utterly and completely and finally as they may have
wished.184

Finally, a word of apology is in order. While this essay has attempted to draw
attention to the generally depreciated contributions of certain groups and individuals to
the effort for Italian unification, be they the peasants, the malicious Cavourian agent
Giuseppe La Farina or the semiotic function of the Sicilian priest or the Sicilian brigand,
it has left out certain populations entirely. Most notably, these include Italian women,
who enjoy even less recognition in scholarship on the Mezzogiorno and the Risorgimento
than do the peasants. In reality, these individuals bore the brunt of the effort for
unification, and continue to carry the heaviest burden of the scholarship circulated and
disseminated by meridionalisti. As scholar Giovanna Fiume describes scholarship prior
to more recent developments,
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The backwardness of the South was represented in the stereotype of the
peasant woman, illiterate, forever pregnant, a supporter of the Christian
Democrats [a particularly scathing stereotype, one might add], religious to
the point of superstition, custodian to the honour of the men in her family.
If in the beginning of this stereotype had a conservative matrix, it later
significantly joined intellectuals, liberals and Marxists in a common view
of women as obstacles to change in a peasant society that was gradually
adapting to modernity.185
While this study, like those that have proceeded it, has failed to feature Italian
women as much as its author would like, and is thus prevented from purporting to have
captured, to any extent, the entire essence of the peasantry’s experience of the
Risorgimento, it is important to at least acknowledge and pay tribute to these individuals
and their most marginalized of places in Sicilian and Italian society. In grave terms,
Villari describes this position,
But in Southern Italy the position of women is very different, and not
unlike that which they enjoy in Mohammedan countries. In some rural
districts, when the husband goes out he shuts up his wife in the house until
his return. Were he to omit to do so, she would look upon it as slight. One
may know a man intimately for twenty years without ever having seen his
wife and daughters.186

After having finished recounting this narrative, like Mack Smith I feel as though
one more apology is due. In outlining this story, it has been the author’s intention to call
attention to the administrative mismanagement that characterized much of the time
during which Giuseppe Garibaldi was hailed as prodictator of Sicily. However, to level
such a critique is unfair if it does not contain a well-pronounced acknowledgement to the
unparalleled and courageous contributions of this Italian patriot, for whatever this
Giovanna Fiume “Making Women Visible in the History of the Mezzogiorno,” from Dal Lago and
Halpern, American South, 173-193.
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legendary individual lacked in administrative capability, he more than made up for it
contributions to the heart and soul of modern Italian identity. As Mack Smith skillfully
illustrates, in a sort of eulogy for the death of the bearded revolutionary and his dream of
a united and truly free Italy,
For all that he could be vulgar, irreverent, headstrong and blustering, he
was a great man in his own way, and instinctively recognized to be such
by the common people. In courage and capacity for energetic action he
was second to none; but he combined with an earnestness of purpose, a
disinterested love of his country, a zeal for social reform, and a simplicity
of character and absence of ostentation or personal ambition, all of which
endeared him to the multitude.187
Garibaldi’s intentions and sympathies, as Mack Smith states, had always been
with those of the common man, as “he believed that Italians should at all costs redeem
themselves by their own initiative, and should not have to rely on French soldiers and
diplomatic bargaining to win their battles for them.”188 Unfortunately, in some circles his
contribution is only viewed as that which is summed up in by Mack Smith once again:
“He had saved the revolution from petering out, but he had also captured it for a political
programme.”189 The current study in no way intends to subscribe to this view beyond its
having resulted from the connivances of the liberals in Turin, whose shrewd diplomacy
outlasted Garibaldi’s courage and initiative in the end.
It is to the efforts of Garibaldi and the peasants that this study has in some way
hoped to do justice to and confer due recognition upon, for their unparalleled
contributions undoubtedly left an indelible and virtuous mark on the course of Italian
history
187
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